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INTRODUCTION
1

In a seminal article, Summers showed that American contract
law is infused with a norm of good faith. Recently, Belobaba and I
demonstrated that Canadian contract law is equally characterized by
f

Tory, Tory, DesLauriers & Binnington; Toronto, Ontario.

*

I received much help in producing this article. The Westminister Institute

organized the Jurisprudence of Contract Law Project, and others provided the setting
and stimulation for my research. I thank the organizers, Michael Bayles and Bruce
Chapman for their efforts. The participants at the two meetings at the Institute offered useful advice and corrected some of my errors and overstatements. I thank particularly Ian Macneil and John Swan, who took the time and trouble to offer detailed
comments on earlier drafts. (This is not to suggest that any of them would agree with
what I have written now.) My thanks as well to Ed Belobaba. Much of the material
summarized in the introduction section of this paper is drawn from Belobaba, Good
Faith in the Law of Contract, Research Paper: Ontario Law Reform Commission Law
of Contract Amendment Project, 1982. (The substance of this Research Paper will likely be repeated in the Ontario Law Reform Commission's Report on the Reform of Contract Law (forthcoming)). Ed also offered helpful comments on the paper generally.
Finally, I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, which
provided me with a Leave Fellowship that allowed the opportunity for the research
and thought responsible for this paper.
1. Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
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a similar norm.' In this paper I explore the significance of these
facts. I argue that the pervasiveness of good faith in contracts has
important implications for theories of contract law, for the relationship between law and society, and for the law in its practical, day-today operation.
Many definitions of good faith contract behaviour have been
given.' In my view, no one definition will suffice universally. Rather,
the variety of contexts in which good faith can become relevant in
law requires a spectrum of definitions, ranging from exhortations to
particularly moral and altruistic behavior, through prohibition of
particularly unacceptable conduct. The good faith of which I treat in
this paper is far less idealistic than that at one end of the spectrum,
and is more aspirational than that at the other end. When I speak of
good faith here, I refer to standards of appropriate behaviour relevant in the community. I believe that within any social grouping,
there exist views and practices concerning standards of conduct in
contract relations that are both widely shared and generally
adhered to. These views and practices express in a day-to-day and
practical sense the manner in which contracts are or are not to be
negotiated and performed. Quite apart from "the words on the
paper," understandings dictate that, for instance, advantage can or
cannot be taken of particular rights or situations. The good faith I
consider is not necessarily the relevant community's view of what
the most moral and other-regarding contractor would do, though
this is certainly a part of good faith more broadly defined. Rather,
what interests me here is that community's view of what range of

2. Belobaba, supra note 1.
3. Good faith has become defined as: reasonableness, Holmes, A Contextual
Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in ContractFormation, 39 U.
PITT. L. REV. 381, 451 (1978); fairness, Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64
IOWA L. REV. 849, 877 (1979); fair conduct, Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial
Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation,39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 442
(1978); reasonable standards of fair dealing, C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 83 (1981);
good faith and fair dealing, Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of
Contract?-Inductions From a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First Party Insurance Contracts, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 330, 338 (1980); decency, fairness,
reasonableness, Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and CommercialReasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI L. REV. 666, 671 (1963); decent
behaviour, Ontario Law Reform Commission, REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS 163 (1979); a
common ethical sense, id.; a spirit of solidarity, UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 210
(1976); community standards of fairness, decency and reasonableness, Thigpen, Good
Faith Performance Under Percentage Leases, 51 Miss. L.J. 315, 320 (1981); and an excluder of bad faith behaviour, Summers, supra note 1, at 200-201.
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conduct is appropriate. The "appropriate" range will include the
"very best" behaviour, but will also incorporate less virtuous conduct. It is a circumstance-bound concept that will, in many cases, be
reducible to notions of fairness and reasonableness in the circumstances.
It is also essential to appreciate the essential fluidity of relevant communities. In some cases I am primarily concerned with
norms prevalent among members of an identifiable enterprise
-members of the stock exchange, professors of philosophy. The
good faith that is relevant is the norm to which members of the
group hold in their conduct with each other. Yet even here, the relevant community can be and may need to be expanded. Broader constituencies (participants in capital markets, the University) have interests in the affairs of the smaller groups, and in some cases, the
good faith standards that are relevant will be those of the larger
groups. My task is complicated by the frequent need to determine
which groups to look to in order to identify relevant standards of
good faith.

GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT LAW
While I will not repeat the arguments made elsewhere,' it is
necessary to summarize the extent to which good faith is a vital
norm in contract law. Its most critical significance is in its effects on
party behaviour. Empirical research has concluded universally that
good faith always has been, and remains, a critical part of the real
world of contracts.' Parties do not live only to the letter of their
contracts (or their pre-contract legal rights), except where living to
the letter is accepted as constituting appropriate behaviour.
But beyond this, good faith pervades the more formal contract
4. Belobaba & Reiter, supra note 2.
5. Macaulay, Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the
Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRAC. LAW. 13 (1963); Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical
Pictures and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & SoCy REV. 507 (1977); Macnefl,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical Neo
Classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854 (1978); I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1978); I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980);
Beale & Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J. LAW SOC. 45 (1975); Belobaba, The Resolution of Common
Law Contract Doctrinal Problems Through Legislative and Administrative Intervention, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (B. Reiter & J. Swan eds. 1980); Ramsay, Book
Review, 58 CAN. BAR REV. 780 (1980) (reviewing Ontario Law Reform Commission,
REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS (1979)).
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law of North America. Good faith is hardly a novel notion: its conceptual roots can be traced back to Roman times.' Nor is its explicit
legislative prescription particularly exceptional. Civil codes of Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland7 all contain some generalized
contractual good faith prescription. In the United States, both the
Uniform Commercial Code8 and the Second Restatement of Contracts9 include good faith requirements. According to the most recent survey, good faith has been adopted as an explicit, independent,
contractual doctrine in at least thirty-two jurisdictions." While there
may have been some room for doubt in the United States before
these codifications and before the publication of Summers' influential article, the view that good faith is broadly relevant in contract
law is now widely conceded.
In Canada, however, the recognition has come much more slowly, and indeed, all dissent has not yet been quieted. In 1956, it could
still be argued publicly that ". . . in English law" there is no overriding general positive duty of good faith imposed upon the parties
to a contract,"'" while more recently, an American scholar could
claim that, ". . . the English courts appear to be moving away from
the Roman concept of good faith in contractual dealings." 3 While
such views were, and are, clear overstatements, it is true that good
faith has not yet been appreciated generally to be an integral part
of our contract law." Virtually no Canadian or English contracts
text mentions good faith in its table of contents or its index, and
only one text author has expended effort in attempting to unravel

6. See generally Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
16 (1956); Ontario Law Reform Commission, aupra note 3, at 163; Trebilcock, Good
Faith in Sales Transactions, Research Paper No. 11.3 (Ontario Law Reform Commission Sale of Goods Project) 4-5 (1974).
7. Discussed in Trebilcock, supra note 6, at 6-14.
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Official Text with Comments) (1972).

9.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

(Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, Revised and

Edited) (1979).
10. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 404 (1980).
11. Canadian lawyers tend to think that the judicial law of England is
automatically part of the law of Canada, but that American jurisprudence is foreign.
Thus a claim that, "In English law . . ." anything is the case, would usually be accepted
as describing the Canadian condition. Fortunately, recent developments have shown
that we are moving away from this sort of colonial mentality, but it would certainly
have prevailed if the statement quoted in the text was made.
12. Powell, supra note 6, at 25.
13. Thigpen, supra note 3, at 321.
14. Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 3, at 163.
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the strands of good faith analysis that permeate more conventional
5
contracts doctrine.'
Yet, closer analysis shows that the Canadian position can be
analogized closely to the American: good faith is integral to our
legislative, administrative and judicial law. A computer search of
federal legislation employing "good faith" language, for example,
revealed forty-seven statutes with one hundred and fifty-three
statutory provisions using the language of "good faith" (usually
without further elaboration).'" Searches of provincial statutes yielded equally impressive results. For example, in Ontario some two
hundred and eighty-five statutory provisions, found in one hundred
and fifty-six statutes, have a "good faith" component. 7
The received tradition that good faith is not part of the Canadian common law must be understood as saying no more than that
good faith is not yet an openly recognized contractual doctrine. A
number of recent studies have concluded, however, that elements or
aspects of good faith permeate, and often dominate many of the
modern doctrines of our contract law so that good faith is accepted
de facto, if not de jure, as a behavioural and legal baseline. 8 This
was the point made so forcefully by Summers in the American context.'9 Belobaba has demonstrated elsewhere, and at length, that
Canadian law offers the same examples of a subsurface bedrock of
good faith as Summers unearthed in his exploration of the foundations of American law.' It is necessary therefore, only to list Summers' "categories" and to offer examples of their acceptance in
Canadian law, in order to emphasize my assertion that good faith
holds firm sway here.
Summers believed that good faith could be best described in
15.

The sample survey included: P. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF

CONTRACT (1981); A. GUEST, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT (1979); M.

FURMSTON, CHESHIRE

AND FIFOOT's LAW OF CONTRACT (1976); G. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (1979); WADDAMS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1977); G. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS IN CANADA

(1976); A. MEULLER, CONTRACTS (1981). Waddams was the exception referred to in the
text.
16. See Belobaba, supra note 1, Appendix A.
17. See Belobaba, supra note 1, Appendix B.
18. Trebilcock, supra note 6; Mullen, Unconscionability in Contracts,
Research Paper (Ontario Law Reform Commission Law of Contract Amendment Project) (1981); Belobaba, Good Faith in the Law of Contract, Research Paper (Ontario
Law Reform Commission Law of Contract Amendment Project) (1982); Belobaba, supra
note 1.
19. Summers, supra note 1.
20. Belobaba, supra note 1, at 5-7.
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negative terms, as an "excluder" of bad faith behaviour."' Thus
defined, he identified four categories of good faith immanent in
American law: bad faith in contractual negotiation and formation;
bad faith in contract performance; bad faith in raising or resolving
disputes; and bad faith in taking remedial action.
Bad faith in contractual negotiation and formation
Here Summers found courts intervening to enforce good faith
requirements in cases of negotiating without serious intent to contract, of abusing privileges to withdraw proposals or offers, of entering a deal without a serious intention to perform, of non-disclosure
of material facts and of taking advantage of another in driving a
bargain.' Canadian courts employ theories of negligence, or promissory estoppel to protect against injuries sustained in the course
of a party's good faith reliance at contractual-negotiation or formation stages. Even more obvious Canadian examples cluster around
Summers' category of non-disclosure. Here, many cases now impose
liability for material non-disclosure.'
Bad faith in contract performance
Summers found American courts involved in six examples of
bad faith here: evading the spirit of the deal; lack of diligence and
slacking off; wilfully rendering imperfect or merely "substantial"
performance; abusing powers to determine contractual compliance;
and interfering with or failing to cooperate in the other party's contractual performance.24 Examples of Canadian courts' interference
for like objects can be found, with particularly well-developed duties
of good faith performance in the "slacking off" area. In a great many
cases, courts have given damages or have even ordered a party to
perform as the court sees appropriate where the party has sought
to excuse himself for failure of a condition in the contract. Thus
where, for example, a contract is "conditional upon the securing of
some specified governmental approval," the courts have expressly
required the anticipated party to try "in good faith" to secure the
approval, to make reasonable sacrifices in order to get it, and to
refrain from extraneous actions that might increase the difficulty of
obtaining the approval, before being able to rely on failure of the
condition to escape from the deal.'
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Summers, supra note
Id. at 220-33.
Belobaba, supra note
Summers, supra note
Belobaba, supra note

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/5

1, at 200-201.
1, at 11.
1, at 234-42.
1, at 12-13.

Reitier: Good Faith in Contract
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT

1983]

Bad faith in raising or resolving disputes
Breaches of the duty to act in good faith were found in Summers' research in cases where a party conjured up a dispute;
adopted overreaching and weaselling interpretations and constructions of contractual language; took advantage of another to secure a
favourable settlement of a dispute, or extorted unfair contract
modifications.' Canadian research has revealed similar judicial concern. A good example is the unwillingness of courts here to enforce
agreements compromising disputed claims until the party seeking to
rely on the compromise establishes that his claim was reasonable
and not vexatious, that he himself had an honest belief in the chance
of its success in litigation, and that he has concealed nothing from
the other party that might affect the validity of the compromise.
The test has been stated expressly to involve the compromise of a
claim made in good faith."
Bad faith in taking remedial action
Summers put four lines of American caselaw under this
heading: abusing the right to adequate security for performance;
wrongfully refusing to accept contractual performance, or rejecting
performance without reason; wilfully failing to mitigate damages;
and abusing the power to terminate the contract.' Canadian examples can be found for all of these categories, but the clearest
cases have arisen with respect to the final one. In a great many
cases, courts have policed "sole discretion" termination clauses to
prevent arbitrary or capricious termination: the power cannot be
used so as to make the contract one that a party might repudiate
"at his own sweet will," but must be used "reasonably," or "honestly
and in good faith."'
The point of this brief overview of Canadian contract law is
thus clear: the caselaw provides ample illustration of judicially imposed or implied good faith requirements. While these judicial mandates are particularly obvious in cases involving issues described as
pre-contract negotiations, contract performance, raising or resolving
contract disputes, and taking remedial action, they are also apparent
in more disparate contexts: implication of terms, interpretation of
contracts, control of adhesion contracts and fine print disclaimers,

26.
27.
28.
29.

Summers, supra note
Belobaba, supra note
Summers, supra note
Belobaba, supra note
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granting or denying equitable relief, indeed any aspect of contract
law that raises possibilities of bad faith behaviour and requires a
judicial decision to reaffirm the traditionally accepted norms of good
faith, fair dealing and the protection of parties' reasonable expectations.' The immanence of a general doctrine of good faith in Canadian contract law is now accepted without significant dissent, and
suggestions that reforming legislation establish specifically such a
generalized duty are seriously opposed only by those who argue
that the exercise is irrelevant." Good faith is thus, equally in
Canada as in the United States, a significant fact in our legal process. It is relevant across the spectrum of legal processes and
lawmaking. It is involved in the norms of those who generate
customary expectations (social views of proper conduct, those whose
actions and expectations create customary practice, trade associations and the like); of contracting parties; of the courts and other
dispute-resolving institutions (arbitration, conciliation, mediation);
and of legislatures and administrative agencies.2
IMPLICATIONS

The more interesting and still largely unexplored questions
relate to the significance of these facts: what does it mean to our
views about the institution of contract to appreciate that a norm of
good faith is immanent throughout? In this section, I explore the implications of good faith on two issues: (1) theorizing about contract;
and (2) the relationship between contract law and society."

30. See generally Belobaba, supra note 1. For implied terms, see Powell,
supra note 6, at 26. For an example of interpretation by this standard, see Staiman
Steel Ltd. v. Commercial & Home Bldrs. Ltd, 71 D.L.R. (3d) 17 (Ont. High Ct. 1976).
For control of adhesion contracts and fine print disclaimers, see Powell, supra note 6,
at 26; Dugan, Standardized Forms: Unconscionabilityand Good Faith, 14 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 711 (1979); Dugan, Good Faith and the Enforceability of Standardized Terms, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1980); and for a recent judicial example, Tilden Rent-a-Car Co.
v. Clendenning, 83 D.L.R.(3d) 400 (Ont. C.A. 1978). For examples in equitable relief
situations, see, Trebilcock, supra note 6, at 3.
31. For a listing of concurring recommendations for reform, and for an example of the argument that legislative reform is irrelevant, see Belobaba, supra note 18,
at 1-4, 17-18. See also generally, Belobaba, supra note 1.
32. Belobaba, supra note 1.
33. Good faith has important implications for a third issue as well: the law in
operation. I have written about this issue at length, elsewhere. Belobaba, supra note 1.
Accordingly, I will not treat the issue here, save to summarize our point in this footnote. Good faith affects each part of the lawmaking process concerned with contracts.
It has implications for custom ani contemporary customary law by involving that
customary expectations are perhaps the major source of contract law. Greater focus on
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Theorizing about contract
(a)

The importance of contract theory

Common lawyers dislike theory. Founded on the pragmatism of
case-by-case decision-making, our judges and lawyers enjoy feeling
that they are guided by no more than "precedent," or the words (intention) of a statute. Admission of a role for theory would lead
directly into that worst of all worlds: a requirement to address
issues of policy directly.
Those naive enough to be able to delude themselves with such
talk tend, in my view, to be successful only in applying some theory
in an inarticulate, unsophisticated, and sometimes inconsistent
fashion. Conscious reflection can often force the M. Jourdan-like
realization that they were "talking theory" all along. It can often require them to face the unsuitability of the theory that has guided
them.
I believe that it is now essential to attempt to elaborate a
modern and useful theory of contract. Much has changed since the
traditionally influential theories were propounded. The issues, that
face contract are vital enough that we can no longer be misguided
by false descriptions or by unacceptable prescriptions. The theory
must provide a general framework that allows essential features of
many disparate phenomena to be grasped and understood in a
manageable fashion. It must be accurately descriptive of phenomena
in the world: it must be capable of comprehending what has been
done in the past, and it must be usefully predictive of developments
that should be anticipated. And the theory must be helpfully
and research into this law is required. Good faith offers the possibility of meaningful
guidance to contracting parties in accessible terms. It explains their duties to them in
a meaningful way and expresses a "morality of aspiration" important to contracting
parties. Good faith is critical to judicial processes, It requires continuation of the process of expanding the relevant, and this enterprise offers two consequential benefits:
the new evidence will point the way to the resolution of a number of problems-offer
and acceptance, the battle of the forms, the relationship of contract to tort, interpretation, standard form contracts, and the control of contract power-that have plagued,
and appeared irresoluble in accordance with traditional contract theory; and the enterprise legitimizes judicial attempts to take account of the many and varied values in
contract law. Good faith is important to legislative processes too. It suggests fields
ripe for legislative intervention, and warns of the danger of legislative intervention
elsewhere. Legislative imposition of good faith requirements is an oft-employed
regulatory technique. Good faith suggests the need for legislation framed generally in
some cases, and most specifically elsewhere. It enhances understanding of the relationships between legislative, judicial and private contracting processes. All of these
points are elaborated in the publications cited.
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prescriptive: it must explain to policy and decision-makers what
directions should be taken, and what paths are not available to
them. The theory will not describe or predict the minutiae. Rather,
it will provide a way of viewing and of anticipating trends and
tendencies that can be expected. This "admission" should not lead to
the claim that theorizing at such levels is the "idle stuff of
philosophers," beneath the concern of (more practically-minded)
lawyers. Lawyers do and must operate on the basis of some theory.
My concern is simply to see that the theory used is appropriate.
(b)

Good faith and contract theory

Appreciation of the depth to which good faith runs in contract
assists greatly in attempts to generate useful contract theory. I will
consider the general implications of good faith for contract theory,
and then proceed to evaluate a number of contemporary theories in
the light of these implications.
(i)

General implications

Good faith has critical significance for the generality with
which a theory of contract must be articulated. More specifically, it
casts grave doubt on theories that would purport to state precise
rules applicable to all contract relationships. I begin from the
premise that in a great many cases, the role of contract law can
usefully be described as the protection of reasonable expectations. I
do not pretend that this is its exclusive task: for instance, contract
law is and must be concerned with the imposition of procedural and
substantive values on parties and with mapping out the appropriate
sphere for the institution of contract itself. Contract law will allow
the disappointment of reasonable expectations in the service of
superior goals. Nonetheless, its most basic task remains the facilitation of the projection of exchange into the future by adding its
authority and force as security for the due performance of what can
reasonably be expected."
A substantial element of what constitutes reasonable expectations is "good faith," defined as what the makers of "right conduct"
(the parties, the industry, custom, relevant social expectations) accept as being properly done in this sort of case. What good faith requires must differ industry by industry, depending on customary

34. See generally Reiter & Swan, Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable
Expectations, Study #1 in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1-22 (B. Reiter & J. Swan eds.
1980).
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practice and expectations. It will differ as contracts tend more to
the discrete or the relational.' It will differ depending upon whether
it is among professionals, among consumers, or between consumers
and professionals. It will differ over time: surely no one should suggest that, given prevailing social, economic, political, and
philosophical views, good faith would require the same sorts of performance in the mid-eighteenth, early-nineteenth and late-twentieth
centuries. As the range of the legally relevant expands, and as we
come to recognize that society precedes contract, and that no contract can be seen other than as set in its social context,"6 it becomes
apparent that what is common in all of contract can be stated only
in the most general terms. What a contract to buy gasoline from a
service centre on an expressway, a contract to buy commodity
futures on an exchange, a contract to buy consumer goods from a
large department store, a contract to develop software, a franchise,
a collective agreement, a corporation, an agreement between state
governments for the long-term supply of electrical power, or myriad
other contract permutations have in common can be expressed only
at levels of substantial generality. I therefore begin with a bias
towards theory that attempts to deal with what is common to all
contract only in terms of general norms, and with a strong skepticism of theory that asserts that identical and specific rules-all
contracts are formed by offers and identical acceptances-can be applied with equal felicity, facility, and utility to all contractual arrangements.
A useful theory of contract must, therefore, be "tiered." What
is common to all contract will be stated generally, while the operational law more directly relevant to particular contracts or relationships will be specialized along lines that differentiate repetitive and
identifiable forms of contract relations.
The tiered nature of contract law is an empirical fact. "Special"
rules govern "the law of" mortgages, insurance, landlord and tenant,
35. The concepts of "discrete" and "relational" contracts have been developed
by Macneil. See e.g., Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 619
(1974); I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980). Basically, they refer to poles on
a spectrum ranging from largely one-shot transactions between parties who have little
other than the transaction linking them (discrete) through contract relations that occur
over long periods of time between parties linked closely in many dimensions (relational). Paradigm examples might be the purchase of gasoline at a distant highway service station (discrete) and the collective agreement linking the United Auto Workers
and General Motors (relational).
36. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 206-218 (1893 revised 1902)
(Free Press ed. 1964).
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corporations, trusts, agency, sale and carriage of goods, banking, international contracts, and dozens of other recognizable forms of contract relations. Acceptable contract theory must comprehend these
special fields. It must also appreciate that the range of contract relations that remains outside these "special" fields is as broad as what
is dealt within them. Thus, no model of contract drawn from any
particular specialty should be expected to be adequate to deal comprehensively with the range of contracts.,
Good faith offers useful insight into the moral bases of contract, and more specifically, into the sources and nature of contractual obligation. Good faith can be seen as the primary basis of contract liability. It entails that contract obligations are seen to arise
because we, as society, 7 think that they should, and only so far as
we think that they should. Contracts can be seen to be binding in
much the same way as obligations of citizenship bind generally. The
obligation to perform contracts should, therefore, arise from a
number of bases. To some extent, every contract could be expected
to partake (in varying degree) of several of these bases. Some contracts derive binding force from the notion of promise, and from the
morality that attends the duty to keep promises. The classic, executory contract for consideration comes readily to mind.' Contracts
derive moral force from notions of consent and voluntariness
associated with liberal views of autonomy and freedom. Taking individuals seriously and increasing the range of their potential to affect the world requires that we pay attention to undertakings they
have chosen deliberately. The invoking of conventions, and consequent moral obligations to honour them, provides a further basis for
the morally binding nature of contracts. So too does the duty to
avoid doing direct harm to others where the harm can be avoided at
an affordable cost.

37. The concept of society here, is slippery. In some cases, the relevant
society may be (e.g.) the members of some industrial grouping or professional organization. In others, it may be the more general society expressing its views through
judicial, legislative or regulatory law. In the latter cases, society may be merely lending its force to the subgroup's views, or it may be imposing other relevant groups'
views in their place. The problem is, at base, that of the relevant reference group
discussed in the text preceeding note 3, supra.
38. Though perhaps only when such contracts are made between generally
non-commercial parties and when they relate to dealings outside of commercial
markets that such parties customarily enter (e.g., the residential housing market). It is
part of my point that the parties, and we as society, do not see commercial agreements
to be equivalent to promises: they are commercial agreements.
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But in the final analysis, and almost by way of compendious
repetition, contract derives its moral and binding force from our
community views on these issues. Contract binds for the same (mix
of) reasons that we should refrain from inflicting physical violence
on others, or should obey law generally. This fact underlines the
necessity that theories intended to address "all contracts" be framed in highly general terms.
Important consequences follow necessarily from these points.
First, contract cannot be segregated and differentiated clearly from
other, related obligations: there is no sharp divide between contract
and other civil duties. This fact is reflected in the "snowflake"
theory of contract advanced elsewhere. 9 Contract cannot be
segregated effectively or conveniently from other legal conceptual
categories. In one dimension, the contract core shades off towards
tort in one direction and towards restitution in the other. In another
dimension, contract lies on a spectrum between public and private
ordering. And in a third dimension, contract lies between individualism and collectivism, between autonomy and social control:
while invoked by consent or by (more or less) "voluntary" acts, the
fleshing out of contract obligations occurs as one facet of implementing our views of social justice. Here, society must address the question of the balance to be struck between contract as an end in itself
and contract as a means of achieving more fundamental social
goals."0 This requirement entails that contract, in any society, is as
moral as that society itself.
This view of the morality of contract has significant implications for all of our lawmaking institutions. Counselling suprapragmatic, aspirational behavior to contracting parties themselves,
it reinforces the ability of lawyers and judges to expand the scope of
the legally relevant, and to draw on all available sources of insight
into our social morality. Perhaps most significantly, it legitimizes
and indeed requires the increasing socialization of contract law with
which our legislatures and administrators have been engaged for the
past two centuries. It offers the fatal stroke to theories of free
enterprise that see social control as antithetical to contract, rather
than as a critical element of it.
39. Reiter, The Control of Contract Power, 1

OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES
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(1981).
40. Blinkered attention to one or other of these objectives (usually, the
former) has been responsible for much of the simplistic thought often brought to bear
on contract.
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(ii) Implications for particular theories
Recently, it has become quite fashionable to attempt to discern
the theoretical basis of contract. Two debates have attracted wide
attention. The first relates to the relevance of the law and
economics movement to contract; the second opposes the contract-aspromise and contract-as-society poles of a spectrum. My concern is
to assess what light good faith sheds on these issues.
My discussion relates almost exclusively to the contract-aspromise debate. The broad utility of the economic approach to law
has been widely and, in my view, sucessfully challenged elsewhere."
The economics of contract law suffers from the inadequacies that afflict the law and economics school generally, and the implications of
its teaching fall to be discounted equally. Essentially, the challenge
holds that the utilitarianism of the economic approach is unsuccessful in its own terms, and that it treats contract as an end
rather than as a means.42 Good faith serves to reinforce the
challenge by introducing the problem of values other than economic
efficiency, by insistence upon the existence of a richness of values in
contracting and contract law. Some economic analysts have chosen
to ignore these other values completely, even to the point of attempts to elevate wealth-maximization to the status of a moral principle: their attempts have been rightly criticized." Others have
adopted the more realistic approach of trying to factor in extraefficiency values through broad definitions of utility as individually
perceived good. Thus a party can be regarded as pursuing utility in
being thoroughly other-regarding, if other-regardingness is perceived as a good by the party. This approach trades the move to reality
for the benefits the theoretical model offered. If the good is defined
simply as whatever people choose to do, the concepts of efficiency
and of its maximization lose all of their descriptive and predictive
force. Good faith serves simply as a reminder of the unlikelihood of
any approach that elevates a single value to the status of universal
solvent of contract.
Good faith provides more direct and independent insight into

41. See e.g., Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a Rich Classificatory Apparatus, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018 (1981);
Weinrib, Utilitarianism,Economics and Legal Theory, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 307 (1980);
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Beatty,
Labour is Not a Commodity, in STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 34, at 313.
42. See, sources cited supra note 41.
43. Weinrib, supra note 41.
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the contract-as-promise debate. The notion that contracts are really
promises, and that they draw moral and practical sustenance from
this characterization, has long been implicit in thinking about contract law. From the paradigm contract that classical economics uses
to justify expectations of efficiency from a market economy (the
discrete sale of fungibles) through that on which myriad traditional
contracts texts premise their anlysis ("Will you sell us Bumper Hall
Pen?")," the idea that "contract" and "promise" can be employed
interchangeably has exercised a pervasive influence.
The idea that promise is central to contract has received extensive support recently in Charles Fried's Contract as Promise.'5
At the level of theory I hope to show that the law of contract
does have an underlying, unifying structure, and at the level of
doctrinal exposition I hope to show that that structure can be
referred to moral principles .... The promise principle . . .is
the moral basis of contract law.'"
Fried proceeds to analyze many of the classic doctrines of contract
law as promises, in an attempt to demonstrate a coincidence between the law's treatment of these issues and the treatment they
would receive at the hands of the morality of promise.
The success of Fried's enterprise can be judged by the descriptive and predictive powers of his theory. In my view, even taking
the argument at its highest and as presented by him, Fried fails to
prove his hypothesis and, rather, demonstrates only that promise is
a relevant element of contract liability in some cases. To be fair,
Fried faces his problem squarely. He admits the need for independent principles to compete with promise in cases where no "true
agreement" has been reached (as, for instance, in operative mistake
and frustration cases). He admits the paucity of "the promise" in
many cases, appreciating that much fleshing out in terms of
44. This is a classic phrase from the famous case of Harvey v. Facey, [1893]
A.C. 552 (Privy Council). In that case, the Privy Council seemingly bought the whole
traditional, abstract notion of the requirement that acceptance of an offer mirror the
offer, hook, line and sinker. The plaintiff sent the defendant a telegram that read:
"Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen. Telegraph lowest cash price-answer paid." Defendant's reply read: "Lowest price for Bumper Hall Pen £900." Plaintiff purported to acceptthe "offer" to sell for £900. The Privy Council held that there was no contract.
Plaintiff's first telegram had asked two questions, and the defendant had answered
only one. Many contract law texts continue to view contracts through such blinkered
vision.
45. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
46. Id. at Preface 1 and at 1.
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customary understandings and reasonable expectations must be
undertaken in order to appreciate what will be held to have been
promised. He recognizes that good faith"2 is thought to pose the
most direct challenge to his concept of contract, explicitly authorizing courts in the name of fairness to revise contractual arrangements or overturn them altogether.
But having identified the weaknesses in his position, Fried's
defence of his position presents arguments that seem only to confirm them. For each time he is up against it, Fried shows that the
promise principle is inadequate both descriptively and prescriptively
to resolve the problems that contract-in-fact throws up. Indeed, at
one point Fried retreats so far as to admit what seems to be the
precise opposite of his theory:
After all, the law itself imposes contractual liability on the
basis of a complex of moral, political, and social judgments. The
limits of that liability must depend on judgments ..
Hardly the stuff of promissory determinism!
The inadequacy of Fried's view is well illustrated in his discussion of "HONESTY IN FACT."49 Here Fried attempts to explain the
spectrum of results achieved in cases where one party fails to tell
the other about a matter known to the former, material to the latter, and known (or suspected) by the former to be unknown to the
latter. Fried presents three cases: an "easy" case for depriving a
non-disclosing, actively concealing vendor of the benefits of the
bargain; a "harder" case, in which an investor in information relies
on its expertise (without any element of misleading) to secure an attractive deal; and an "easy" case at the other end of the spectrum,
where the "informed party" is, essentially, a "known gambler" and
the contract can fairly be seen as an understood speculation about
risks.
What promise adds to the analysis (or perhaps, criticism) of the
results our law would be likely to reach in these cases is well
beyond me. The "fraudulent non-disclosure" case turns out (for
Fried) to be a case where there is no promise at all because "the
obligation of promise does not take hold where the promisor has not
knowingly undertaken that obligation . . .the contract did not come
into. being .... '" So the case falls to be decided not by promise, but
47.
48.
49.
50.

As well as duress and unconscionability.
C. FRIED, supra note 45, at 69.
Id. at 77-85.
Id. at 81.
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rather, "the competing equities must be used to resolve the inevitable dilemma. . . ." In the "harder" case, Fried suggests that
there is a promise (What distinguishes the promisor's obligation
from the first case?) but whether or not it should be allowed to
"count" will depend upon conventional views and general
background understandings of acceptable conduct. 5' These same conventions and understandings make the third ("gambling") case an
easy case for Fried, and also serve to explain the exceptional duties
of disclosure and fidelity that are cast upon fiduciaries for "efficiency, redistributive and altruistic" reasons (presumably, inter alia).
In the end, Fried would determine the issue of when disclosure
is required in all of his cases by reference to socially accepted standards of behaviour. A better argument for the general significance
of good faith can hardly be imagined. The variations that can be expected in judicial responses to the "harder" case (depending upon
the precise circumstances, the identity and attributes of the parties,
the expectations of those in the relevant industry, etc.), are ideal illustrations of the role of the norm of "right behaviour" in resolving
disputes. Fried seems to think that he has saved his case by showing that the background understandings and non-promissory values
that are factored into decisions prevail before the disputes that give
reason to refer to them are decided. While this may respond to unsophisticated versions of the theories of Kennedy or Kronman," it
fails to respond at all to the argument that duties are defined and
thrust upon the parties "because they are so situate and our views
of proper behavior in such circumstances are the following. .. ."
"The promise" turns out to have virtually no independent
significance in resolving the non-disclosure cases. Rather, it serves
only as a trigger for the law to begin the sorts of important inquiries into understandings and conventions that really are
necessary. The "promise" simply expresses a willingness to get involved in the deal, and therefore to have the law "go to work" on
the deal. But this. willingness to get involved could as easily be expressed or perceived in terms other than promise. The core of the
trigger in the non-disclosure cases could as easily be "agreement,"
51. Id.
52. Id. at 82-3.
53. Fried deals in this way with theories propounded by Kennedy & Kronman. His argument may be valid to the extent that the theories he criticizes would
propose efficient or altruistic decisions with a forward-looking component only.
However, neither Kennedy nor Kronman would, I believe, suggest that the expectations and understandings of relevant reference groups are not to be considered in
determining what is efficient or fair.
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"consent," or "voluntariness," as "promise." Pursuit of the law's
responsibilities would not be impeded by the loss of the benefits of
analogy to the morality or nature of "promise," were the mechanism
triggering the law's involvement expressed in other terms.
Similar criticisms can be applied to much of the rest of Fried's
argument. The issues that arise for the law he discusses constantly
fall to be decided through equities, conventions, restitution, reliance
or tort, rather than through promise. And this is only the surface of
the indictment. For Fried is not discussing, and his analysis does not
help with, the real issues that contract-law-in-fact must address. The
discussion takes place entirely in the context of such traditional
categories as offer and acceptance, unilateral mistake, consideration
and the like. Even assuming that Fried's theory could explain
Dickinson v. Dodds or Adams v. Lindsell (it does not),' who cares?
Does it describe or prescribe results in any case that does matter?
Does it help with the responsibilities to be attached to prospective
contracting parties; 5 with the battle of the forms;' with mass and

54. In Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (Eng. C.A. 1876) (a leading case on offer and acceptance) an offeror was permitted to revoke on Thursday an option he had
promised to keep open until Friday. The offeree had not paid anything for the promise
to keep the offer open. But Dodds did make an undisputed promise. Fried says that
the law regarding consideration is too confused and incapable of predicting anything
for him to have to explain such cases. C. FRIED, supra note 45, at 37-9. In Adams v.
Lindsel, 106 E.R. 250 (Eng. K.B. 1881) (a leading case on contracts entered into by
mail) defendants were held to have contracted with plaintiffs when defendants' letter
was misdirected by them, and was received late by plaintiffs, in consequence. Plaintiffs' mailed reply came back in the usual course of post, even though it arrived later
than defendants expected (not then knowing of the misdirection) and after defendants
had, accordingly sold the goods. Defendants were "responsible", even though it was
clear they were not prepared to promise and had not in fact promised to contract at
the later date when the reply was received. The Court said that defendants "must be
considered in law as making, during every instant of the time their letter was travelling, the same identical offer to the plaintiffs" (emphasis added), even though it was
quite clear that no such promise had in fact been made.
55. A number of recent Canadian cases have raised this issue. Carman v.
Canadian Pacific Railway, (Supreme Court of Canada, June 23, 1982); A & K Lick-aChick Franchises Ltd. v. Cordiv Enterprises Ltd., 119 D.L.R.(3d) 440 (N.S. Sup. Ct.
1981); Canadian Kawasaki Mtrs. Ltd. v. McKenzie, 126 D.L.R.(3d) 253 (Mt. Cty. Ct.
1981); Buchanan v. CIBC, 125 D.L.R.(3d) 394 (B.C.C.A. 1980).
56. This famous class of case causes problems where the two sides of a deal
use their own standard form contracts, and each standard form purports to prescribe
the terms of the deal and to exclude the relevance of the other form. The ensuing
problem has been termed the accomplishment of the "legal equivalent to the irresistible force colliding with the unmovable object." Matter of Doughboy Industries, Inc.,
233 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1962).
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standard form agreements;57 with problems of contract interpretation or determination of performance requirements;" with enterprise power to impose dangerous or low quality products, externalities or anarchic development?" These cases are the stuff of
modern judicial involvement with contracts. If Fried's "theory of
contractual obligation" does anything, it does little of interest.
Directed only at a very limited, and largely extinct-in-fact "core"
form of contract, it fails to appreciate any of the lessons of relational
contract law. In particular, it ignores the fact that "the promise" is
only a very limited part of what makes up the parties' views of their
relationship, and the law's (and others') views of what that relationship requires in terms of appropriate conduct or responsibility and
of what shall be done in cases of default. As an instruction to
judges, contract as promise is woefully deficient in content.
As a prediction or prescription of legislative action, contract as
promise is thoroughly bankrupt. Indeed, Fried does not even mention legislation, or a role for it, in his discussion of "contract law."
Fried deals with an institution that exists in large part only in the
minds of some academics, seemingly for their amusement. Good
faith offers significant insight into why that institution cannot exist
in the real world, and it remains, as Fried feared, a fatal indictment
of the view that there is much general utility in the notion of contract as promise.
A somewhat more promising theory is suggested by Atiyah in
his extensive Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract." Atiyah argues
that in the nineteenth century promise achieved prominence as an

57. The issues arising from the fact that many contracts are not dickered
over, or individually scrutinized (as were, in theory anyway, those on which classical
contract was founded) are immense. They were brought into the glare of general
scrutiny by Kessler's famous article, Kessler, Contract of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943), and a great many authors
and cases have considered them since. See e.g., Dugan, Standardized Forms, supra
note 30; Dugan, Good Faith, supra note 30.
58. These issues arise in a great many contexts. One field that generates
much litigation has had occasion to consider them frequently. This is the field of real
estate transactions, and specifically, of vendor and purchaser law. Here questions of interpretation arise constantly in respect of lot size, conditions, and attributes of purchased property. The question of what sort of title is to be conveyed is litigated constantly, raising issues of the standard of performance required. This sort of litigation
bulks large in the overall load of civil litigation, but the issues are the same sort as
tend to be the most frequently fought-over in other fields as well.
59. See generally Reiter, supra note 39.
60. Atiyah, supra note 15.
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independent principle of contractual liability replacing earlier, more
socially-based theories, but that over the- twentieth century (in particular), the process has been reversed. Atiyah does not make clear
precisely what his theory of contract's state now and in the future
will be: this is to be presented in a forthcoming companion volume
to The Rise and Fall. However, he does suggest that much comfort
will be drawn from the notions of benefit and reliance, concepts
developed by Fuller and Purdue." Liability will be imposed on parties because, and to the extent that, they have received benefits
from others, or have suffered losses through (reasonable) reliance.
It is obviously unfair to criticize Atiyah's theory -he has not yet
presented one. However it is worth attempting to assess, from the
perspective of the lessons of good faith, how far any theory based on
benefit and reliance could possibly carry us. In my view, good faith
suggests that benefit and reliance are clear advances over promise,
but that they are still only partial answers, way-stations along the
route to acceptable theory. They are thus characterized correctly by
Macneil as "intermediate contract norms," 6 parts of the package
needed to appreciate contract usefully.
The problems with benefit and reliance relate to their failure
to break cleanly enough from the paradigm "bargain" of classical
contract theory. The notions are useful insofar as they move beyond
promise to appreciate that when benefits change hands and when
reasonably expected reliance causes easily avoided harm, these
social facts may serve as sources of social concern. But their focus
and strength still lie with the small and discrete contract between
two moderate-sized contracting parties. The model is "party-bound,"
appearing to test benefit and reliance from the perspective of the
parties, and failing to focus more broadly on the context in which
benefits are given and reliance occurs. This party-bound focus
obscures two critical issues. First, relevant reference groups, and
not just the two parties, must be involved in decisions about
benefits and reliance. Which benefits must be compensated, and
which may be retained without (full) recompense? What, indeed, will
be held to count as benefits? Or as retention? What reliance is at
the risk of whom? Why should reliance be undertaken at another's
expense? And most revealing, what reliance is reasonable (and what
should be done in terms of protecting it)? A two-party focus cannot

61. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.
REV. 52 (1936).
62. I. MACNEIL THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 52-56 (1980)
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help us with these issues. Second, a moment's thought indicates that
contractual liability is imposed for a plethora of reasons beyond
benefit and reliance. These two reasons are vital to a certain range
of contracts (in particular, to many of the cases around which our
classical law of contract was fashioned) but they can be employed
only with great difficulty, or not at all, to many of the issues that
contemporary contract law raises. For instance, the notions are not
helpful (or, at best, are not adequate) in determining what standards
of decency we will require of those procuring contracts from others.
This issue has come up often of late, as courts flesh out the standards of behaviour required of those who enlist franchisees and
guarantors, or who deal with neophyte businessmen.63 Similarly, the
notions shed little light on issues of power and procedural justice
that arise from large-scale enterprise, standard forms and
widespread market-failure: the problem of "exemption clauses" has
been before our courts incessantly for several decades."' Nor do
these ideas assist with the great issues: confrontation of the fact of
differential endowments and the extent to which we are prepared to
allow the differences to be asserted, and the balancing of contract
values and other social values.
Reliance and benefit, like promise, enclose too small an area to
be a comprehensive theory applicable to all contract. Comfortably
applicable to only a part of contract in judicial lawmaking, they fail
to take account of the subtlety of private lawmaking and offer only
limited guidance to legislators.
The weaknesses of contract as promise, and of benefit-reliance,
are the strengths of the theory ranged at the other end of the spectrum, Macneil's "relational contract law." Relational contract law is
nothing if not expansive. It addresses contract behaviour from the
perspective of everyone interested in contract; from first party contractors, through judges, legislators and those who conceptualize
about contract. And it is capable of comprehending an exceptionally
broad range of contracts, from the trade of market fungibles
through the multinational corporation to the state and the international community. Relational contract law is, at once, quite simple,
and exceedingly complex. Its essence is the simple point that no contract (or other) transaction is ever. "wholly discrete." Rather, to
some extent, every contract contains "relational elements" that go
beyond the purely economic aspects of the exchange involved. These
63.
64.

See authorities cited supra note 55.
See authorities cited supra note 57.
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relational elements require that understanding of contract take account of them. And the beginning of understanding is the appreciation that contract is a social institution:
The fundamental root, the base, of contract is society.
Never has contract occurred without society; never will it
occur without society; and never can its functioning be
understood isolated from its particularsociety.65
The complexity of the theory derives from its attempts to elaborate
the implications of these basic facts across the range of contract
relations. At this level, Macneil identifies "intermediate contract
norms," discernible in various ways and to differing extent in contract relations." Appreciation of these norms allows insight into the
nature of contract. Specific focus on some of them suggests potentialities for, and potential dangers of the institution.
Good faith supports Macneil's work, encourages its continuation, and suggests directions for its elaboration. Relational contract
law appears to accept thoroughly the lessons of good faith. It does
not focus on any single paradigm to the exclusion of other sources of
contract liability: reciprocity, implementation of planning, effectuation of consent, and restitution and reliance (the cornerstones of
contract-as-promise and of benefit-reliance theories) are norms only
included along with such others as role integrity, solidarity, power,
and harmonization with the social matrix. It does not divide contract
sharply, either from other sources of liability, or from other aspects
of our social life. It offers "rules" about contract at the sort of
general level that good faith demands, allowing as well for the
elaboration of more specific rules for specialized fields in terms of
the same norms, but as particularly applicable to the circumstances
of each speciality.
Good faith is not listed among the intermediate contract norms,
and it may be that "proper behaviour" could be added in order to
enhance Macneil's descriptive accuracy. If it is true that parties
recognize socially determined obligations to act in particular ways,
that judges refer to such norms for standards for dispute-resolution,
and that legislators frequently act to assert them as well, then a
descriptive theory ought probably to acknowledge good faith explicitly. Relational law suffers little from failing to acknowledge the
norm expressly: the whole theory is instinct, with a sense of our
65.
66.

I. MACNEIL, supra note 62, at 1-2. (emphasis in the text).
Id. at 36-70.
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obligation to examine what the parties, and what we, as society, expect from contract, if we are to begin to understand the institution.
Macneil's. elaboration of the intermediate norms reflects a clear appreciation that relevant views of appropriate behaviour will determine the contours and significance of each norm in different contractual relations. What unique substantive content good faith would
add, if included as an intermediate norm is not clearly or easily apparent. Certainly, elements of what good faith involves are incorporated within such norms as reciprocity, role integrity, solidarity,
harmonization with the social matrix and supra-contract norms. It is
not necessary that good faith stand alone in order to be properly included in Macneil's list: all of his norms are interwoven and each
partakes of elements of all of the others. Perhaps the independent
significance of good faith lies in four important elements of contract
to which it counsels attentiveness. First, it reminds us of the incompleteness of written or even oral records of contracts. The limits
of human foresight, the costs and threat to solidarity of increased
specificity, and the insurmountable barrier to complete communication attributable to our individuality ensure that no record of a contract can be complete and identically understood by all. Second, it
entails "trust," an element in whose complete absence no contracting could occur. Third, it points out the participatory nature of contract. Contracts are never two-party affairs, but borrow heavily
from various surrounding communities, from language for communication, through industry practice to the supra-contract, general
social norms and finally good faith stresses the moral element present in even the most hard-nosed commercial agreement.67 Contract
is a form of social behaviour infused with notions of doing right. Present throughout the other intermediate norms, this fact, without
which contract could not exist, merits independent attention.
Relational contract law has been criticized for its complexity
and for its generality. Critics argue that it is incapable of providing
useful guidance to lawyers, judges and legislatures. Good faith puts
such criticisms into perspective. The need for generality in any
realistic theory has already been demonstrated." What remains to
be done with rational law is to elaborate in two dimensions. First,

67. Particularly in such contracts, where whole person relationships may be
absent and where the cash nexus is the sole motivating force of the deal. Such transactions are possible only because participants understand that, e.g., industry standards
of appropriate behaviour will prevent excesses and will allow for adequate predictability of the other side's likely conduct.
68. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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the specialty-laws must be derived from the overarching theory.
While it may be true that the nine intermediate norms will not
"solve" a concrete contract case, or direct enactment of a particular
statute, this fact is neither surprising nor significant. No great
theory of anything is self-applying. Elaboration of relational law can
show the appropriate interplay of the norms in the consumer
mortgages, franchise, corporate law, or other specialty fields. This is
a job of detail, and it is already being undertaken by Macneil and
others. The tiered law that good faith predicts explains both the
level of Macneil's general theory and the need for detailed specialtywork before the theory can be "applied" with facility.
The second dimension in which elaboration is required presents
greater difficulties. Relational law stands idle, like a huge machine
waiting for current to be switched through it. Macneil has attempted to build a neutral model of the institution of contract, and
there is no reason to criticize him for choosing such a goal. In its
present state, the theory can illuminate, and this is no mean achievement. But it cannot truly bite on judicial problems, it cannot direct
legislatures and inspire private contractors until our society's views
about contract are plugged into it. Relational contract law operates
as the medium through which our social philosophy relevant to contract is brought to bear on the institution-in-fact, as it operates in
the world.
Macneil does not fail to appreciate the need to power his
model. He knows that what drives it will differ by society, and that
in the end, "supracontract norms" will determine the place and
shape of contract as an historical fact."" Good faith operates as a
compendious expression of our considered views on the role of contract. In the institutionalized search for these views, we will find the
power that will switch relational law on, for our society, and that
will demonstrate and enhance the practical utility of the theory.
The matter is not as difficult as it might appear. At least
within many of the specialty fields, or within common sorts of relations, our views of what constitutes acceptable behaviour can be
discerned. While it might be better, and even possible, to generalize
a theory of our social philosophy from, and in respect of these relations, it is unnecessary to do so: the specialized theory can resolve
the specialized problems. It is outside of these fields, and where our
philosophy is weak, that we founder. It is in such areas as pre-

69.

I.

MACNEIL, supra
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contract torts, defining the standards of conduct required of one
who would enlist a franchisee or guarantor, or deciding how far advantage can be pushed that our philosophical failures come home to
roost."' Relational law will have to address the philosophical issues
directly as it moves from universal theory to practical application.
Can we derive a social consensus at the level required? In my
view, good faith, as manifest in all contract behaviour, offers real
hope that diligent inquiry will yield adequate working hypotheses.
This issue is explored in greater detail, below.
Contract law and society
Two important elements of this interaction are implicit in
everything that has been said above. First, contract, defined as the
process of projecting exchange into the future, is a pervasive fact in
modern society. Contract is an element of some of the most trivial of
our social relations, but is involved in the most fundamental of them
(up to and including the state itself) as well. Its norms are,
therefore, to a significant extent, our norms too, and the study of
contract can tell us much about ourselves. Second, contract draws
its sustenance, indeed its substance, from society. Durkheim was
clearly right when he recognized the priority of society to contract.
Durkheim's point can even be expanded, for not only is contract pervasive, but, as well, all of our lawmaking institutions are involved in
its preservation, operation and limitation. From custom through
judging to legislation, society makes contract.
I will survey two further consequences of the recognition of
good faith: its implications for liberalism, and its implications for
solidarity.
(a) Implications for liberalism
Good faith requires a blurring of any proposed line between
the private and the public. Good faith sees contract liability as imposed by society because this is thought to be desirable. Society is
the backdrop and the medium for contract. Social control of contract
(whether by way of limitations on contract power or of positive
duties imposed on contracting parties) is pervasive. The duty to contract and to perform in good faith is elaborated and enforced
through institutions as diverse as peer pressure and property
70.

71.
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seizure. In fact, the reintroduction of good faith into descriptions of
contract represents part of the process of the resocialization of contract law (of law generally) required after the nineteenth-century's
attempts to disembarrass contract of complicating elements of
morality. While this nineteenth century attempt failed to exert
significant influence on contract-in-fact, it did make its mark on
descriptions and theories of contract. There, the very aim of contract was seen to be the freeing of individuals from the bonds of
societal limitations on their activities, expressed through such
restrictive institutions as the guilds, closed towns, custom, convention and natural law, as perceived through reasoned reflection.
Good faith represents a different perception of empirical facts
and an alternative aspiration. It accepts the fact and necessity of a
major role for custom and convention in contract. It includes as a
positive norm, and not as an unfortunate element to be promptly excised, that contract power should be controlled, that the exercise of
contract power may, in many circumstances, be tantamount to the
exercise of public power, and that boundaries of decency ought fairly to be imposed upon each. By reintroducing the social into contract, legitimacy concerns that may properly be raised about social
control from will-of-the-parties, contract-as-promise perspectives are
dissipated. Good faith is both the means through which society
reacted to nineteenth century assaults and reasserted the primacy
of the social to the economic and the individual, and the evidence of
the general success of this "spontaneous social reaction."72
The predominance of community standards in one of our most
fundamental and pervasive institutions provides important data that
should be considered in the contemporary liberal revival. At least
three issues should be influenced by these data. First, it appears difficult to begin at the classic liberal starting point, the individual.
The bounds of the individual, and of individual potential to affect
the world, are much set by communal views of appropriate
behaviour. Indeed, and as I shall elaborate below, our very perceptions of many individuals are conditioned by and premised upon
their group membership and their shared group morality. Glendon's
8
in beginning with the
The New Family and the New Property,"
relationship of individuals to groups, and evaluating what the sup-

72. The phrase is Polanyi's. See generally, K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1957), for an excellent discussion of the nineteenth century transformations.
73. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981).
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port of these relationships entails and requires, is a recent example
of the sorts of new departures for liberalism that the recognition of
good faith will require.
Second, it is apparent that increased sophistication must be
brought to bear on the contract-as-freedom/contract-as-coercion
debate. If norms of proper behaviour operate through the contract
institution, norms that assert society's redistributive interests and
its concerns about power and other externalities emanating from
contract, then it is apparent that contract is a far more subtle and
complex institution than its supporters on the right and its opponents on the left would have us believe. Havighurst spoke of contract as a blend of equality for the strong and equality for the
weak." It is just this complexity of contract that has escaped its
most ardent supporters and critics, and that is expressed in
society's true view that contract is a Good Thing, so long as it is
kept within the bounds of the acceptable, of good faith. 5
Third, good faith requires that progress be made in understanding our own views of liberalism if we are to know more about
contract. This point was raised earlier, in my discussion of the need
to "power" Macneil's model. Here, I assert that we can understand
contract better only if we know ourselves better. Inquiry into the
contours of good faith shares much of the same space as inquiry into
what our liberalism is and what it requires. To a great extent, good
faith becomes the liberal debate in the contract field, for the issues
to be resolved are such as the following: "How far is it appropriate
to allow endowments to assert themselves? (And which endowments?)"; "How far should we permit contract to externalize its
consequences?"; "To what extent is consumer demand an appropriate determinant of the good?" Good faith searches for answers
to these classic liberal questions in our institutionalized responses to
them, believing that what we do is a strong expression of how we
feel about these matters. Good faith permits such inquiry directly, in
ways in which contract-as-promise (for instance) cannot: it can
distinguish among promises and can cope with social change that
will vary our views on which contracts are good contracts.
74. A. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 131 (1961).
75. Obviously, if contract is defined as "the relations among parties to the
process of projecting exchange into the future," I. MACNEIL, supra note 62, at 4, contract can be neither good nor bad, it is just a part of life. I use "contract" here in a
more limited sense, as the private or free enterprise pole of a spectrum that might
have authoritive dictatorship (of the right or the left) at the other pole.
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Implications for solidarity

Durkheim feared that increasing specialization would ultimately threaten the possibility of society. The division of labour would
replace "mechanical solidarity" with "organic solidarity," and would
reduce the common conscience to little except an individual ethos. In
The New Social Contract, Macneil attempted to assuage these fears.
Accepting Durkheim's criterion of solidarity, "sources of a clear
shared morality uniting a whole society," and his view that
"Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything
which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything
which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other
than the striving of his ego is moral and morality is as solid as these
ties are numerous and strong,""0 Macneil identified "at least" four
important sources of the common conscience in modern society
beyond that of a straightforward individual ethos: "a high level of
technological and capital determinism; norms arising from the division of labor itself, including among others all the common contract
norms; a morality of sacrifice; and fear.""
Good faith contributes to the understanding of solidarity in
modern society in three ways: it provides support for Macneil from
a slightly different perspective; it allows for elaboration of a couple
of these points; and it suggests further potential sources of solidarity. As I argued above, exchange, and institutions for its functions,
are large parts of our social fabric. If I am right about the
significance of good faith in contract, then contract and exchange institutions contain within them elements of altruism and otherregardingness. Life in contractual society partakes of the selffulfilling-prophecy nature of international law: good faith (morality)
is a fact; it is generally regarded as a virtue; and it is generally
honoured. Indeed, good faith stands to engender a higher degree of
compliance than international law, for it evolves and authorizes
harsh sanctions ranging from peer pressure through application of
formal legal sanctions. The solidarity-potential of good faith and its
sanctions must be enormous, for the law of good faith and its sanctions bubble up in large part from their social base.
Good faith also suggests that contract serves as a basis of
mechanical solidarity. This point can be reached if we see contract
to be, in part, a means (as its early supporters did) rather than solely an end in itself. The end towards which contract militates is pro76.
97 (1980).
77.
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gess towards the goals of our liberal ideology: recognition of our
moral equality, and decision-making through rational discourse. The
struggle is not individual against individual, but rather all of us
together striving through the best mechanism we can devise to
reach shared goals (including shared goals of rights to individuality
and privacy). Good faith is thus not a brake on individual liberty,
but rather a constant reminder that contract is partially a means
and not only an end, and that the means must be constrained if the
end is to be approached. A shared belief in the liberalism underlying
contract may well serve as the single greatest source of solidarity
(Who doesn't believe in the high-sounding phrases of our Constitutions?). Good faith is the concrete expression of our view that the
nexus of contract is greater than the cash nexus and is not solely
directed at it.
Two further features of contract in contemporary society provide grounds for optimism. First, our society is replete with heavily
relational contracts. For many of us, contractual associations are
central facets of our lives, even to the extent of defining our self
and peer images as "philosophy professor," "trade union steward"
and the like. The essence of many such associations is found in
mechanical solidarity and in sharing. The norm of good faith is pervasive, not only within the association but also in members'
behaviour (as representatives of the group) in extra-group contacts.
Glendon's work demonstrates how these associations replace not
only the individual as the relevant focus of our inquiry, but also
such formerly vital relationships as the family. Glendon counsels attention particularly to the role of industrial associations that she
claims are becoming the primary groups in our modern times."8 But
such syndicalism approximates very closely the "occupational
groups" that Durkheim suggested as the cure for sagging solidarity
in specialized societies. 9 The norms of good faith, mutual respect,
and altruism that Durkheim required are precisely those that hold
these groups together.
The enhanced significance of voluntary (and especially occupationally based) associations allows for speculation about the role of
the fact and of a norm of "participation" as a source of solidarity.
The fact has been the subject of much recent work of those
concerned with employment, in particular." These writers stress the
importance of employment as a form of self-expression, as a source
of identity and as the vital link that allows most of us participation
78.

M.

79.
80.

For instance, and for further sources see, Beatty, supra note 41.

GLENDON, supra note 73.
DURKHEIM, supra note 36, Preface to the Second Edition (1902) at 1-31.
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in our central exchange institutions (and thus in our social life), in
addition to its financial support function. This participation in institutions that, in a partially capitalist economy (at least) serve as
centres of government, links us all, in much the same way that
citizenship, as expressed in equal participation (civil rights and
voting), creates sentiments of community.
Good faith is involved in two aspects of this participation in
contract. First, it allows for the possibility of the merger of self and
other-interestedness that permits the existence of long-term voluntary associations. Second, it serves as the mechanism to protect participatory rights in much the same way as due process protects our
more formal and general citizenship rights. This latter function can
be particularly well observed in the context of employment relations. There, express duties of good faith protect employees' participatory rights in their jobs against bad faith dismissal: to protect
the right of collectivities of workers to participate in collective
bargaining; to protect minorities within and without the collectivity
from bad faith abuses of power and to limit externalities that may
arise from the collective bargaining process." The rise to prominence of the significance of participation counsels social action to
extend its reach to the contractually-at-risk, or dispossessed.2
81. Good faith is the standard required explicitly in many collective
agreements, in order to terminate a workers' employment. Good faith has also been
used as a limit on seemingly-open powers of termination. Fortune v. N.C.R., 364
N.E.2d 1251 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1977); Prozak v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada [1982
37 O.R.(2d) 761 (H.C.). The requirement to bargain in good faith is imposed legislatively
on both management and labour representatives in many jurisdictions, and orders
have been made requiring parties to obey their duty to bargain in accordance with this
standard. Bargaining agents are often subjected to duties of good faith in fairly
representing all members, even non-union members, of their bargaining units. And
society everywhere has reacted to the fact that labour disputes can wreck significant
harm on parties not directly privy to them by judicial and legislative enactment of
elaborate codes of permitted and prohibited labour practices.
82. Macneil has warned of the problems involved in imposing good faith from
the outside: bureaucratic imposition of norms, if it works at all, yields progeny different from that produced by self-germination. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal
and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. __
(1983). Two points occur, nonetheless. First, the
social action counselled, can well be (and may best be) spontaneous: our role could be
no more than to notice facts and raise consciousness. Second, a less-than-best solution
may be required in any event. Recognizing that parasitic use of institutions is not
"natural" use of them, the artificial replication of healthy norms elsewhere might, over
time, power a self-fulfilling prophecy. The inclusion of the dispossessed in mainstream
norms can enhance both their own self-respect and our views of them. The dangers are
clear: destruction of healthy institutions, at least capable of caring for the losers, and
further harm to the self-respect of the latter following failure in vain enterprises. But
the crisis that is coming as we realize that we will not be able to continue to have (and
to assuage with) materially more cries out for bold responses.
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